



**U.S. Department of Justice**

*United States Attorney  
Southern District of New York*

*The Silvio J. Mollo Building  
One Saint Andrew's Plaza  
New York, New York 10007*

June 11, 2021

**BY ECF**

The Honorable Vernon S. Broderick  
Thurgood Marshall  
United States Courthouse  
40 Foley Square  
New York, NY 10007

**Re: United States v. Cameron Collins, S1 18 Cr. 567 (VSB)**

Dear Judge Broderick:

The Government writes to oppose the June 1, 2021 application of Cameron Collins seeking early termination of the five-year term of probation that the Court imposed when it sentenced him on January 23, 2020.

Title 18, United States Code, Section 3564(c) provides that, in the circumstances present here, “[t]he court, after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, may . . . terminate a term of probation previously ordered and discharge the defendant . . . if it is satisfied that such action is warranted by the conduct of the defendant and the interest of justice.”

Early termination of probation “is not warranted as a matter of course.” *See United States v. Gerritson*, No. 01 cr. 1081, 2004 WL 2754821, at \*3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 2004). “Rather, the defendant must show that there is a ‘new or unforeseen circumstance,’ such as exceptionally good behavior.” *Id.* (citing *United States v. Lussier*, 104 F.3d 32, 36 (2d Cir.1997)). Early termination is not warranted where a defendant did nothing more than that which he was required to do by law. *See United States v. Medina*, 17 F.Supp.2d 245, 247 (S.D.N.Y.1998) (“Unblemished” conduct while under supervision cannot alone be classified as “exceptional” and “cannot be sufficient reason to terminate [supervision] since, if it were, the exception would swallow the rule”).

In seeking early termination of his term of probation, Collins makes several arguments. First, he points out that his compliance with probation thus far – and with pretrial supervision before that – has been perfect. The Government does not dispute Collins’s characterization of his record while on probation. The law is clear, however, that “[m]erely complying with the terms of [] probation and abiding by the law are not in and of themselves sufficient to warrant early termination of probation, rather this is simply what is expected of [a] [d]efendant.” *United States v. Caruso*, 241 F.Supp.2d 466, 469 (D. N.J. 2003)

Nor has the balance of the Section 3553(a) factors changed in such a fundamental way as to warrant a modification of the sentence that the Court imposed only 17 months ago. Collins's good works and dedication to others were factors that were well-established at sentencing, and the Court appropriately took them into account in fashioning a non-custodial sentence. On the other side of the ledger, the offense remains a serious one, and the Court's original sentence was carefully fashioned to achieve specific and general deterrence and to provide just punishment for the crime, which included obstruction of justice. The inconveniences associated with Collins's probationary status are just that: inconveniences. They are not inhibiting his ability to lead a happy and productive. They do, however, serve as a reminder to Collins and those around him of the consequences of violating the law. Because that reminder was an important component of the Court's original sentence, the Government opposes Collins's request.

By: /s/  
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